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Abstract
This paper explores contractual features of housing Þnance and uses data from international housing
markets to provide evidence supporting the Þnancial accelerator (Bernanke et al. 1996, 1999).
Among households whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who
can borrow against a larger fraction of the housing value (achieve higher loan-to-value, or LTV ratio)
have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality in borrowing capacity is at the heart of the
mechanism underlying the Þnancial accelerator. Our empirical strategy uses international variation
in maximum LTV ratios to show that housing prices as well as demand for new mortgages are more
sensitive to income shocks in countries with higher LTV ratios, consistent with the dynamics of
a collateral-based Þnancial accelerator in household spending. We also Þnd that the empirical
relationship between maximum LTV ratios and income sensitivities is stronger in countries where
housing prices are low relative to household income. Because collateral constraints are less likely to
bind when housing is more expensive (an income constraint may bind instead), these latter results
further suggest that a collateral-based accelerator is indeed behind the observed cross-country
differences in income sensitivities.
Key words: Financial accelerator, household spending, housing prices, collateral constraint, income con-
straint.
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I Introduction
Recent theoretical research proposes that endogenous developments in Þnancial markets can greatly
amplify and propagate small income or interest rate shocks throughout the economy (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997; and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996, 1999). Bernanke et al. (1996) call this
ampliÞcation mechanism the Þnancial accelerator or credit multiplier. The key idea behind
the Þnancial accelerator is the notion that shocks to the net worth of Þrms and households have a
procyclical effect on their borrowing capacity. This could happen either because the information
cost wedge between external and internal Þnance moves countercyclically (Bernanke and Gertler,
1989), or because a procyclical change in the value of collateralizable assets changes the amount
of collateralized external Þnance in the same direction (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Following a
positive income shock, agents should be able to raise more external Þnance and the increase in
borrowing capacity would further boost investment spending. According to this view, Þnancial
mechanisms such as the endogenous procyclicality of external Þnancing capacity can help explain
important features of the business cycle and the transmission of monetary policy.
There is little direct evidence on the ampliÞcation mechanism which underlies the Þnancial
accelerator. Most empirical studies use Þrm data to explore one insight behind the accelerator:
income shocks should affect corporate spending only when Þrms have imperfect (constrained) access
to external Þnance. Empirically, the investment spending of Þnancially constrained Þrms should be
more sensitive to changes in net worth than the investment spending of unconstrained Þrms (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988).1 In the same vein, constrained Þrms spending and borrowing
should ßuctuate relatively more in the aftermath of monetary and other macroeconomic shocks
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994). Unfortunately, while comparisons between constrained and
unconstrained Þrms may indicate whether one groups spending is more dependent on current
income following an economic shock, they will not identify whether differences in spending stem from
an endogenous Þnancial ampliÞcation mechanism: because constrained Þrms are more dependent
on current income for investment funding, they should be more sensitive to a shock that affects
income even when the shock has no cyclical effect on their borrowing capacity.
So how can one identify whether there is an independent spending effect coming from an endoge-
1See Hubbard (1998) for a survey of the literature on Þnancial constraints and investment-cash ßow sensitivities.
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nous change in borrowing capacity following a shock? The theory suggests that the quantitative
effect of an aggregate income shock on constrained agents spending would be greater when debt
capacity is procyclical. Hence one testing approach consists of directly quantifying the overall
magnitude of the ampliÞcation effect for constrained Þrms with procyclical net worth; this is the
spirit of the simulation exercises in Bernanke et al. (1999). An alternative approach is to gauge
the degree of procyclicality in agents borrowing capacity and then pin down the dynamics of the
Þnancial accelerator by looking at cross-sectional differences in the spending responses to economic
shocks among strictly constrained, cyclical agents. We pursue such an approach in this paper.
The housing sector is an ideal laboratory for conducting our proposed test of the theory. As
suggested by Bernanke et al. (1996), households Þt models of the Þnancial accelerator particularly
well; especially collateral-based versions of the accelerator. The crucial feature of housing Þnance
contracts we explore in this paper is that the availability of mortgage credit to households is typically
limited to a speciÞc proportion of the value of the home they own or are about to purchase (the
maximum loan-to-value, or LTV ratio). The maximum LTV ratio is, in effect, a credit quantity
constraint. To see how the Þnancial accelerator works in the housing market, suppose households
receive a positive income shock that boosts their demand for housing. Clearly, the higher the LTV
ratio that households can achieve the higher the increase in their borrowing capacity. Housing
values should thus respond more to the initial income shock when the LTV is high. The procyclical
increase in the housing value will itself allow households to further increase borrowing and the
collateral-based spending cycle gets ampliÞed. The relationship between LTV ratios and the income
sensitivity of housing demand therefore provides for a direct test of the endogenous mechanism
which underlies the Þnancial accelerator. To wit, the impact of shocks to household income on
housing spending is ampliÞed by the higher marginal opportunity to borrow associated with a high
loan-to-value ratio.
Testing this prediction requires some degree of (exogenous) variation in borrowing constraints
(i.e., LTV ratios). Because LTV ratios vary widely around the world, data from international
housing markets can be used to test our accelerator story.2 To give a concrete example of what
we have in mind, consider a country in which housing Þnance is not well-developed, such as Italy,
2We are not the Þrst to explore the contrasts provided by international housing markets to make inferences about
aggregate economic behavior. Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), for example, have used international differences in
LTV ratios to study consumption and savings behavior.
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where historical maximum LTV ratios do not exceed 60%. Take, on the other hand, a country
such as the UK, where LTV ratios average 90% in the last two decades. The accelerator argument
would suggest that so long as the collateral constraint is binding in both countries the housing
credit multiplier should be much stronger in the UK than in Italy.
Of course, a direct relationship between maximum LTV ratios and housing price ßuctuations
should only hold if housing demand is indeed constrained by the availability of collateral. In fact,
it is possible that housing demand is limited by an alternative borrowing constraint: the income
constraint. The income constraint stems from real-world features of mortgage contracts that limit
the yearly amount of housing expenditures associated with the loan (loan payments plus property
taxes) to a certain fraction of the households yearly income. For our purposes, the key difference
between the collateral and the income constraints is that only the former gives rise to a credit
multiplier. If the income constraint binds, a households marginal opportunity to borrow depends
on its future income stream rather than on the current value of housing. The upshot of integrating
both types of constraints on household spending in a Þnancial accelerator model is the observation
that whenever the income constraint binds the positive relationship between LTV ratios and the
sensitivity of housing prices to income vanishes. Empirically, recognizing this additional constraint
provides for yet another layer of contrasts for our panel data tests of the accelerator.
Disentangling the effects of the income and collateral constraints is not a trivial task. Our
empirical strategy, however, explores well-known characteristics of international housing markets
to identify situations in which the income constraint is more likely to bind in the Þrst place. In
particular, we conjecture that the income constraint is more likely to bind when the price of a typical
housing unit is relatively high vis-à-vis household disposable income (high price-to-income ratio).
Cross-country differences in price-to-income ratios  engendered, for example, by demographic
and geographical factors  introduce variation in housing affordability. We predict that if the
relationship between price sensitivities and the LTV ratio is driven by the collateral constraint,
then it should be especially strong in countries with more affordable (cheaper) housing.
The evidence of this paper supports the Þnancial accelerator. Our tests show that housing
prices are indeed more sensitive to income shocks in countries with higher maximum LTV ratios.
Our estimates indicate that in countries like the UK, where the LTV ratio is around 90%, housing
prices decrease by more than 1.2% in the Þrst year following a 1% decrease in per capita GDP.
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On the other hand, in countries such as Italy, where the LTV ratio is around 60%, housing prices
decrease by only some 0.8% following a 1% decrease in per capita GDP. These results indicate that
the credit multiplier has a considerably greater impact on household spending in countries where
the maximum LTV is high. Consistent with our conjectures about the joint role of income and
collateral constraints, we also Þnd that the relationship between LTV ratios and income sensitivities
is stronger in countries where housing is cheaper relative to household income.
Our empirical analysis explicitly recognizes a number of alternative factors that could poten-
tially inßuence the results we obtain. For example, we control for variables which are likely to be
correlated with maximum LTV ratios and which could also explain the cross-country differences
in income sensitivities, such as economic development and the propensity for homeownership. In
particular, we Þnd that the effect of the LTV ratio remains after expunging the component that
is explained by economic development and homeownership. At the same time, the relationship
between the LTV ratio and income sensitivities remains after instrumenting the LTV ratio with
variables that absorb cross-country differences in overall Þnancial development, such as the devel-
opment of the judicial system and the quality of accounting standards. Our evidence suggests that
Þnancial development is a contributing factor to the real-side effects of the Þnancial accelerator. As
a Þnal robustness check, we avoid looking at housing price responses altogether, focusing instead
on the demand for new mortgages. Although we only have limited data on mortgages, we again
Þnd evidence that is consistent with the multiplier: new mortgages respond positively to household
income shocks, and those responses are increasing in LTV ratios.
Our paper is related to several different strands of literature. Our empirical approach borrows
from Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), who study the relationship between Þnancial development
and macroeconomic variables such as savings growth and the sensitivity of the consumption to
changes in income. Jappelli and Pagano use maximum LTV ratios as a measure of Þnancial con-
straints on households exactly as we do: higher maximum LTV ratios are associated with higher
debt capacity and less Þnancial constraints on households. They Þnd evidence that maximum LTV
ratios help explain cross-country differences in key macroeconomic variables.
The sensitivity of housing prices to household income has been examined by Lamont and Stein
(1999). Using data from the US, they Þnd that housing prices are more sensitive to changes in
city-level GDP in years when homeowners in a particular city have very high leverage. They
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interpret these results as evidence that households are likely to be liquidity-constrained when their
leverage is high, which is consistent with the idea that constrained agents are more sensitive to
income shocks than unconstrained ones. Our analysis, in contrast, uses international variation
in maximum LTV ratios and in price-to-income ratios to identify procyclicality in debt capacity
among strictly constrained agents.3 While Lamont and Steins goal is to examine the effects of
liquidity constraints on asset pricing (with an application to housing), our paper aims at shedding
some new light at the ampliÞcation mechanism implied by the Þnancial accelerator.
There is also a large literature that uses micro-level data to test the effects of Þnancial constraints
on the housing market. This literature suggests that Þnancial constraints help explain several
housing variables, such as the propensity for homeownership (Linneman and Wachter, 1989; and
Haurin et al., 1997), the type of mortgage chosen (Hendershott et al., 1997), mortgage reÞnancing
and prepayments (Archer et al., 1996; and Caplin et al., 1997), gifts and intergenerational transfers
(Engelhardt and Mayer, 1998) and owner-occupants selling behavior (Genesove and Mayer, 1997).
Most evidence pertains to the US market, with several of the papers analyzing the joint effect of
the income and collateral constraints.4
The role of Þnancial constraints in housing markets has also been studied by a few theoretical
papers. Stein (1995) analyzes the impact of a down payment constraint on the equilibrium of the
housing market and Þnds that the sensitivity of prices to shocks to fundamentals (such as income)
is higher in the constrained equilibrium. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998, 1999) consider the effect
of an interaction between household heterogeneity and a collateral-type constraint for housing
price ßuctuations. Their model features an ampliÞcation mechanism which relates to the one we
emphasize in this paper: an income shock gets ampliÞed through its effect on the ability of young
households to afford down payments.5 Neither of those papers analyzes the effect of changes in the
down payment requirement (the LTV ratio), nor the independent effect of the income constraint.
3Notice also that the key housing Þnance variable we use (the maximum LTV ratio) is conceptually very different
from households existing leverage. The maximum LTV ratio represents the marginal opportunity to borrow as a
function of the value of housing, while households leverage is an endogenous variable determined by past borrowing
decisions.
4There are very few international studies on housing markets, most of them using a small set of countries (such
as Cutler et al., 1991). Englund and Ioannides (1997) is an exception in that the authors characterize housing price
dynamics for a panel of 15 OECD countries. However, they do not focus on Þnancial constraints. Malpezzi (1990)
discusses the interactions between Þnancial development and housing markets.
5One of their main implications is that since housing prices depend particularly on the income of young households,
the income of young households might be a more appropriate aggregate variable to include in housing price regressions.
Unfortunately, the international data we have do not allow us to account for such heterogeneity in our tests.
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Even though our focus is mainly empirical, this gap motivates us to start the paper by laying out a
very simple model where we introduce these considerations. We do this in the next section (Section
II). In Section III we provide a detailed description of the international housing markets data we
use in the study. In Section IV we present our empirical results. Section V concludes the paper.
II Collateral and income constraints in a model of housing de-
mand
A Structure
We start our analysis of constrained housing demand using a simple model framework, based on
Stein (1995). There are two goods in the economy, housing (H) and food (Z). The price of housing
(P ) is measured in units of food. There is a representative household endowed with total lifetime
income equal to W1+W2. There are two time periods in the model. The household only consumes
in the Þnal period (t2), but it must choose at time t1 how much to spend on housing. In contrast,
food is purchased at the time it is consumed.6 We assume throughout that the gross, riskless rate
of interest in the economy is equal to 1.
At time t1, the household only has access to current income W1. It cannot borrow directly
against future income W2 because future income cannot be pledged to creditors, and thus the
household might be constrained in its choice of housing. The household can raise mortgage debt
against the value of its housing wealth.7 The value of the mortgage loan (call it B1) that can
be raised is subject to two constraints. First, the loan cannot be higher than a certain fraction
λ ∈ [0, 1] of the value of the home, that is:
B1 ≤ λPH (1)
The parameter λ can be interpreted as the maximum loan-to-value ratio. The higher the λ, the
easier it is for a household to borrow in order to Þnance spending.8 In the real-world, this parameter
depends on variables such as the costs of enforcing and disposing of collateral, regulations about
housing Þnance, and the amount of information creditors have about borrowers.9 The fact that the
6These assumptions eliminate intertemporal effects other than the fact that the household must purchase housing
before consuming it fully.
7We are not explicitly considering the role of inherited leverage from past mortgages and other borrowings.
However, existing leverage can be thought of as a reduction in household income W1.
8When λ = 1, for example, the household will be Þnancially unconstrained.
9See Japelli and Pagano (1994) for a detailed discussion.
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parameter λ can be lower than 1 represents in effect a credit quantity constraint on households.
An alternative approach would be to focus on the relative cost of funds, or more speciÞcally, on the
wedge between the borrowing rate in the mortgage market and an appropriate lending rate. As
discussed by Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), however, this wedge does not appear to be a viable
explanation of the cross-country differences in the Þnancial liabilities of households. Differences in
interest rate wedges across countries seem negligible and there is no clear relation between lending
volumes and wedges. For simplicity, we therefore assume that the household pays no interest
rate premium when it borrows up to the limit λPH. We call Eq. (1) the households collateral
constraint.
The other constraint faced by households in real-world mortgage contracts is the income con-
straint. The income constraint essentially limits the yearly amount of housing expenditures asso-
ciated with the mortgage contract (loan payments plus property taxes) to a certain fraction of the
households yearly income, which in the US is around 28%.10 Steins model does not incorporate
the idea of an income constraint. In order to accommodate that constraint in the present model
 which also lacks an explicit intertemporal component  we assume that the total value that
must be repaid to creditors at t2 (that is, B1) must be lower than a certain fraction k ∈ [0, 1] of
the households future income W2, plus any amount saved from t1 to t2 (call it s1):
B1 ≤ k(W2 + s1) (2)
Finally, as in Stein, we assume that the households utility function for housing and food is
given by:
U = α ln(H) + (1− α) ln(Z) (3)
B Analysis
The household maximizes the utility function U subject to the following constraints:
PH + s1 =W1 +B1 (4)
Z =W2 + s1 −B1 (5)
B1 ≤ min[λPH, k(W2 + s1)] (6)
10Unfortunately, we do not have data on the income limits for other countries.
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where the savings s1 must be nonnegative (s1 ≥ 0).
Some properties of the optimal solution are immediate from the examination of these conditions.
If the constraint in Eq. (6) is binding, then the household cannot bring enough income from the
future to the present in order to Þnance its optimal housing expenditures, which implies s1 = 0.
This is true even when the income constraint is binding, since k ≤ 1. On the other hand, if
constraint (6) is not binding, then savings and borrowing are not uniquely determined and will be
related according to the budget constraint of period t1:
s1 =W1 − PH +B1 (7)
Replacing this last equation in the budget constraint of period t2, it is easy to see that the
household whose borrowing is not constrained solves the following problem:
max
H,Z
α ln(H) + (1− α) ln(Z) s.t. (8)
PH + Z =W1 +W2 (9)
Thus an unconstrained household chooses optimal housing and food consumption effectively using
total lifetime income as its relevant wealth variable. The optimal unconstrained housing demand
(as a function of housing price) is then given by:
HU (P ) = α
W1 +W2
P
(10)
The household will be constrained when the maximum amount that it can borrow to Þnance
housing is not enough to Þnance the unconstrained demand HU (P ). Let Bmax1 be deÞned by:
Bmax1 = min[λPH
U (P ), kW2] (11)
The household will be constrained when:
PHU (P ) > W1 +B
max
1 (12)
In this case, the optimal housing demand is determined directly from the constraints.11 There are
two possibilities to consider, depending on which constraint (collateral or income) is binding:
11Notice that if W1 is low the household is more likely to be constrained. If we think of past leverage as a reduction
in W1, this effect is consistent with the main hypothesis tested in Lamont and Stein (1999): when leverage is high
households are more likely to be constrained and the effect of an income shock on housing prices is larger than in the
benchmark unconstrained case.
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i) If the income constraint is binding, the maximum housing demand that the household can
Þnance is given by:
HI(P ) =
W1 + kW2
P
(13)
ii) If the collateral constraint is binding, then we have:
HC(P ) =
W1 + λPH
C(P )
P
(14)
In either of these cases, the household consumes the rest of its lifetime income in food, that is,
Z =W1 +W2 − PH.
Examination of Eqs. (13) and (14) reveals the key difference between the collateral and the
income constraints and clariÞes the role these constraints play in the Þnancial accelerator. The
collateral constraint is endogenous, in the sense that the households capacity for external Þnance
depends on the value of housing. Hence a shock to current incomeW1 that changes housing demand
will be ampliÞed by the endogeneity of debt (as in Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). When the income
constraint binds, on the other hand, debt capacity only depends on future income and there is no
natural ampliÞcation mechanism.
Considering the effect of a change in current income on housing demand (while taking the
housing price as Þxed) it is easy to see that:
∂HU
∂W1
=
α
P
≤ ∂H
I
∂W1
=
1
P
≤ ∂H
C
∂W1
=
1
(1− λ)P (15)
The reason for the Þrst inequality is that the constrained household spends a greater fraction of
current income on housing. In terms of the model, the optimal fraction to spend on housing is
given by the parameter α. The constrained household is underinvesting in housing, and thus will
direct the entire change in current income to housing.12 The second inequality shows that the
sensitivity of demand to income will be even higher when the collateral constraint binds, because
of the ampliÞcation effect associated with the endogenous change in debt capacity.
C Model implications
Our simple analysis has a number of interesting implications. First, notice that the sensitivity of
demand to income will depend on the loan-to-value ratio if and only if the collateral constraint
12 If there was intermediate consumption in the model, then the constrained fraction spent on housing would also
be higher than the unconstrained one, but it would no longer be optimal to spend all income in housing. The gist of
our results, however, would be the same.
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binds. So long as the household is collateral-constrained, an increase in the loan-to-value ratio will
tend to increase the sensitivity of demand to income. Thus, the less constrained the household
is, the higher the sensitivity of demand to current income will be. If the LTV ratio is so high
that the constraint no longer binds, then the sensitivity falls either because the household becomes
unconstrained or because the income constraint will bind instead.
From Eq. (6), the condition for the income constraint to bind is given by:
k
λ
<
PH
W2
(16)
This condition indicates that the income constraint will bind when the value of housing is high
relative to household income. If housing prices vary across countries due to factors such as geography
and demography, then we should expect the income constraint to be more likely to bind in countries
where housing is relatively expensive. This condition is intuitive. In some countries, housing can
be so expensive in comparison to household income that it does not matter whether the maximum
loan-to-value a household can achieve is 40% or 90%.
One difficulty that we face when taking this model to the data is that changes in housing demand
for a particular country are not directly observable. In particular, the available international data
consist primarily of housing price indices for different countries. One would need implications for
the housing market equilibrium, and in particular for the sensitivity of housing prices to current
income, in order to utilize those data. In our case, we need to assume some degree of rigidity
in housing supply in order for our model implications to carry to price data. To see this in the
simplest possible way, suppose that housing supply is perfectly inelastic. Then we can show that:
∂PU
∂W1
= α ≤ ∂P
I
∂W1
= 1 ≤ ∂P
C
∂W1
=
1
1− λ (17)
where PU is the unconstrained price level, and P I and PC are, respectively, the price levels when the
income or the collateral constraint binds. Clearly, the constrained sensitivities are higher than the
unconstrained one, and the sensitivity is highest when the collateral constraint binds. Furthermore,
if the collateral constraint binds the sensitivity is increasing in the loan-to-value ratio. If one can
assume that housing supply is sufficiently inelastic in the short-run, then the properties we derived
for housing demand should translate into housing prices. This particular supply-rigidity assumption
is standard in the housing literature (see, e.g., Meen, 1996; Voith, 1996; Malpezzi and Mayo, 1997;
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and Mayer and Sommerville, 2000) and seems to be reasonably well-supported in the limited data
we have on housing starts.13 Should housing supply be very elastic, on the other hand, then we
should fail to uncover any evidence of the accelerator.
Another issue for our tests is that when we compute the effect of changes inW1 we are effectively
assuming that there is little correlation between changes in current income and changes in future
income (W2). If there is a strong empirical correlation betweenW1 andW2, the comparison between
the sensitivities across cases (for example, constrained versus unconstrained) might not be as clean
as what we had above. In order to see this, suppose that:
W2 =gW2 + ρW1, (18)
where ρ is a measure of the correlation between W1 and W2. It is easy to see that the sensitivities
of price to current income will become:
∂PU
∂W1
= α(1 + ρ) (19)
∂P I
∂W1
= (1 + kρ) (20)
∂PC
∂W1
=
1
1− λ (21)
The most important change is that it is no longer clear that the sensitivity is highest when the
collateral constraint is binding. It could also be the case that the unconstrained sensitivity is
higher than the constrained ones. Yet, the implication that sensitivity increases in the loan-to-
value ratio if and only if the collateral constraint is binding remains unchanged. Recall, this is the
only theoretical result we need to support our claims about testing for Þnancial accelerator effects
within a set of Þnancially constrained agents.
Finally, as in most papers dealing with measures of Þnancial development, we need to ensure that
our Þndings are not simply driven by economic development. In our particular case, it is possible
that the sensitivity of prices to income increases with economic development even when households
are unconstrained. This could happen if the fraction of income spent on housing (the parameter
α) is strictly increasing in economic development. Since economic and Þnancial development are
correlated, it could be difficult to disentangle this story from our explanation based on collateral
13Regressing a measure of new dwellings (and, alternatively, a measure of the change in housing stock) on various
lags of GDP, we Þnd no evidence of a signiÞcant response of housing starts to current and recent lags of income.
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constraints. In the empirical section, we shall verify that our results cannot be ascribed to economic
development alone.
We can summarize the testable implications of our model as follows:
1. If the collateral constraint is binding, then the sensitivity of housing prices to changes in
current income should be increasing in the maximum LTV ratio available to households.
2. If the relationship between price-income sensitivities and the LTV ratio is driven by the
collateral constraint, then it should be especially strong in countries where the value of the
typical housing unit is low relative to household income (i.e., in countries where the income
constraint is less likely to bind).
We test both of these predictions in turn.
III Data description
We use data on housing price indices for the 26 countries listed in Table 2 for the period 1970-1999.
The housing price data are summarized in Table 1 together with the data on per capita GDP (the
main driving variable in the empirical speciÞcation) and annual new mortgages (which we use as
an alternative endogenous variable). We use yearly changes in the logs of GDP and housing prices,
deßating the data with consumer price index series taken from the IMFs International Finance
Statistics database. New mortgages are expressed as a fraction of nominal GDP. The data on
housing prices and new mortgages are hand-collected from different sources, while the GDP data
are taken from the IMF Þnancial statistics. We list all of our data sources as well as provide detailed
information about the different indices used in the Appendix.14
− insert Table 1 here −
Table 2 displays country data on maximum LTV, price-income, and homeownership ratios. The
maximum LTV ratio is the empirical counterpart of the parameter λ in the model of Section II.
Most of these data are taken from Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994), who also use the maximum
LTV ratio as a measure of the availability of credit to households in an international context. As
they argue, the maximum LTV ratio is a direct and objective measure of liquidity constraints on
14The data used in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
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households that is comparable across countries. We were able to augment the Jappelli and Pagano
dataset using data from Chiuri and Jappelli (2000), and by looking at the sources cited therein.
We also use a few other sources for LTV ratios (see the Appendix).
Notice from Table 2 that LTV ratios vary signiÞcantly around the world. Developing countries,
such as Korea and Taiwan, generally have lower LTV ratios (as low as 30%). However, there is
variability even among developed economies, as evidenced by the case of Italy, where LTV is 60%
during the 1990s, versus 95% for the UK in that same period. LTV ratios vary less over time for
the same country, with a few exceptions, such as Sweden and Spain.
The data on homeownership and price-income ratios were also hand-collected from several
different sources. The homeownership ratio represents the proportion of home owners as a fraction
of total households. The price-income ratio is the ratio of the typical price of a dwelling unit to
yearly median household disposable income. It effectively represents the number of years it takes
for the median household to earn the value of a typical home. Notice from Table 2 that both
the homeownership and the price-income ratios remain relatively stable over time. It is clear from
the table that in countries such as Switzerland and Singapore housing units are substantially more
expensive than in other countries, such as the US and Canada. Our empirical analysis will
use these cross-country differences in price-income ratios to gauge whether the income constraint
introduced in Section II is likely to be binding in a given country.
− insert Table 2 here −
IV Empirical tests
Our main goal is to examine the empirical relationship between the sensitivity of housing prices to
income shocks and maximum LTV ratios across countries. According to the Þnancial accelerator
hypothesis, that sensitivity should be especially strong if the maximum LTV ratio is high, because
of the endogenous change in debt capacity following a positive shock to income. Since the collateral
constraint is more likely to bind in countries with more affordable housing, the relationship between
LTV ratios and sensitivities should be stronger in countries with cheap housing (i.e., low price-
income ratios). Finding that these patterns are present in the data is consistent with evidence in
favor of the Þnancial accelerator in housing spending.
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A Housing price dynamics
In order to test our hypotheses we need a benchmark empirical model of housing prices. The
housing literature suggests a set of determinants (other than current income) to include in this
model. For instance, there is ample evidence of a consistent autoregressive pattern in housing
prices. There is positive autocorrelation at short lags (Case and Shiller, 1989; Poterba, 1991; and
Lamont and Stein, 1999), but negative serial correlation at longer lags (Case and Shiller, 1990;
and Lamont and Stein, 1999). This pattern has been shown to hold in international data as well
(Englund and Ioannides, 1997). We experiment with the use of these lag structures in turn.
In Table 3 we pool the sample in a panel regression and search for an appropriate empirical
model to Þt the data on housing prices. All regressions include year effects. Column (1) shows that
real housing prices are indeed correlated with real current income (proxied by real per capita GDP).
Two additional lags of per capita GDP are also signiÞcant when no other variables are included
in the regression, as shown in column (2). Columns (3) and (4) show that there is positive price
autocorrelation at short lags, but negative autocorrelation at longer lags (long-term reversal). This
is true both with and without the inclusion of country effects.15 Our international data shows some
of the same patterns of previous studies focusing on the US housing market.
− insert Table 3 here −
Column (5) adds other macroeconomic variables to the model of column (3). Both the real
interest rate and the inßation rate have negative effects on housing prices, but their effects are not
always signiÞcant. Finally, in columns (6) and (7) we use the empirical model proposed by Lamont
and Stein (1999) in their study of housing price dynamics in US cities. Essentially, they replace
longer lags of price and income changes with the start-of-period ratio of price to per capita income
(Pricet−1/Incomet−1). As in Lamont and Stein, column (6) shows that longer lags of price and
income become insigniÞcant when we include the lagged ratio of price to per capita income. The
more parsimonious speciÞcation of column (7) seems to capture well the effects of the longer lags.
In the next section we introduce the LTV ratio and the income constraint in the analysis, using,
alternatively, the speciÞcations in columns (1), (3), (4), (5), and (7) of Table 3. This veriÞes that
15Following the standard approach in the literature, most of our models are estimated via OLS and include both
lagged dependent variables and Þxed effects (see, e.g., Lamont and Stein, 1999). We however, recognize the potential
for biases in this procedure, and later emphasize results from the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator.
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our Þndings do not hinge on the selection of a particular speciÞcation for housing price dynamics.
B Financial constraints and the income sensitivity of housing prices
We introduce credit constraint effects in our analysis by allowing the price-sensitivity of income to
vary according to the maximum LTV ratio. This amounts to augmenting our baseline empirical
models by adding an intercept term for the LTV ratio and another term capturing the interaction
between LTV and per capita GDP growth. When we use lags of GDP growth, we interact the LTV
ratio with all of the lags of GDP change, besides the current change (lag 0). This approach will
capture the effect of the accelerator even if it takes longer for it to feed through the economy. We
then test whether an increase in LTV increases sensitivities by testing whether the parameters on
those interaction terms are signiÞcantly greater than zero.
Table 4 presents one of the main set of results of the paper. Column (1) shows that the
correlation between changes in prices and changes in income is indeed higher in countries with
higher maximum LTVs. The positive effect of the LTV ratio remains after we include further
lags of price and income in the speciÞcation, as shown in column (2). The sum of the interaction
terms of the LTV with the current and past lags of the change in income is positive and signiÞcant
at the 1% level. When we include country effects in the model the sum of the interaction terms
increases (see column (3)). Column (4) shows that the inclusion of inßation and interest rates in
the speciÞcation reduces the effect of the LTV ratio, but the sum of the interaction terms is still
positive and signiÞcant. Finally, the interaction of the LTV ratio with the current change in income
is also signiÞcant (at the 10% level) when we use the Lamont and Stein speciÞcation. This last
speciÞcation makes it convenient to assess the implied magnitude of the effect of the LTV ratio
on income sensitivities. The coefficient returned for ∆Log(Income)t × LTVt suggests that if the
LTV goes from 0.60 to 0.90, the income sensitivity increases nearly 50%, from 0.84 to 1.23. These
estimates imply, for example, that a 2% drop in per capita GDP will depress housing prices by
some 1% more in the UK than in Italy.
− insert Table 4 here −
Table 5 reports the results we obtain after imposing several modiÞcations to our basic empirical
models. For brevity, we use the speciÞcation with three lags of income and prices (columns (2) and
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(3) of Table 4) as a benchmark.16
− insert Table 5 here −
Our interpretation of the positive correlation between the LTV ratio and the income sensitivity
of housing prices is that this effect is driven by differences in the availability of mortgage Þnance to
households in different countries. To provide further evidence that our results are indeed driven by
differences in Þnancial constraints as opposed to some sort of simultaneity bias, we instrument the
LTV ratio with variables which we expect to be related to the overall level of Þnancial development in
different countries. In countries with higher Þnancial development it should be easier for both Þrms
and households to raise outside Þnance. In the context of mortgage Þnance, a higher level of Þnancial
development should be reßected in the availability of higher LTV ratios for households.17 Our set of
instruments includes the index of accounting standards computed by the Center for International
Financial Analysis and Research. Accounting standards have been used as an instrument for
Þnancial development in Rajan and Zingales (1998), among others. The second variable included
in our instrument set is a proxy for the effectiveness of the countrys judicial system. This proxy is
taken from LaPorta et al. (1998). The idea is that, the higher the standards of Þnancial disclosure
and the more advanced the judicial system in a country, the easier it is for Þrms to raise funds
from a wider circle of investors. Assuming that similar variables inßuence the availability of Þnance
to Þrms and households, accounting standards and judicial efficiency are appropriate instruments
for the maximum LTV ratio.18 The results on the Þrst two columns of Table 5 show that the
effect of the LTV ratio on income sensitivities actually increases after instrumenting for overall
Þnancial development. This is true both with and without the inclusion of country effects. These
results suggest that our previous Þndings are indeed driven by underlying variables affecting the
availability of Þnance.
To the extent that maximum LTVs and economic development might be correlated, one could
argue that the results in Table 4 are primarily driven not by Þnancial development, but simply
by cross-country differences in economic development. The theoretical section suggests that if the
16Our conclusions are similar when we choose other speciÞcations featured in Table 4 for these series of tests.
17Notice that Þnancial development is in principle distinct from overall economic development; even though they
are correlated.
18The Þrst-stage regressions indeed show that our instruments and the maximum LTV are strongly positively
correlated. The R2 of the Þrst-stage regression is 0.39.
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fraction of wealth spent in housing increases with wealth, then it could be the case that richer
countries have larger income sensitivities, even if Þnancial constraints are never binding. This
provides for an unconstrained explanation for the observed pattern in sensitivities. Another
possible explanation for our results is that the relationship between maximum LTV ratios and
income sensitivities is driven by cross-country differences in homeownership.19 One could argue,
for example, that countries with large rental markets have lower sensitivities and lower LTV ratios
because the rental market helps absorb the effect of an income shock, or because only the wealthiest
households own homes in countries with low LTV ratios. In particular, in economies with high LTV
ratios demand for housing could be more cyclical simply because the marginal borrower in these
economies is poorer, and thus more sensitive to current economic conditions. If this argument
explains our results, then the cross-country differences in income sensitivities we observe should be
absorbed by variations in the homeownership ratio.
In columns (3) through (6) we address the relevance of these competing stories by adding proxies
for economic development (ten-year average values of per capita GDP in constant international
prices)20 and homeownership to our speciÞcation. In columns (3) and (4) we add the economic
development proxy together with all of its interactions with lags of log income change (lags 0
through 2).21 In columns (5) and (6) a similar approach is used to control for homeownership.22 The
results from these tests suggest that neither economic development nor homeownership are robustly
related to income sensitivities, after controlling for the LTV ratio. The sum of the interactions with
economic development are positive as hypothesized, but never signiÞcant. More importantly, the
positive effect of LTV on sensitivities remains mostly unchanged after controlling for homeownership
and economic development. The sum of the interaction terms of the income changes with the LTV
ratio is positive (albeit smaller) and signiÞcant at better than 5% test level in 3 out of the 4
speciÞcations. In one speciÞcation (with economic development and country effects) the sum of the
interaction terms is only marginally signiÞcant (p-value of 11.9%).
Our model suggests a speciÞc economic mechanism behind the relationship between Þnancial
19Table 2 shows that there is substantial variation in homeownership ratios around the world.
20The averaging is intended to match the frequency of the LTV series.
21The coefficients returned for these controls are mostly insigniÞcant and are thus omitted from Table 5.
22Results are similar if we use both of these variables and all of their interaction terms together in one speciÞcation.
The same applies if we use a more parsimonious approach where we use only the LTV and its interactions with income
change in the speciÞcation after expunging economic development and homeownership main effects from LTV (i.e.,
using the residual LTV).
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constraints and price-income sensitivities. If the household is Þnancially constrained, the effect
of a change in income is ampliÞed by the associated increase in borrowing capacity; and this
ampliÞcation effect is higher the higher is the LTV ratio. If this argument is correct, the income
sensitivity of new borrowings by households should also be higher in countries with high LTV
ratios. In columns (7) and (8) of Table 5 we use total annual new mortgages divided by nominal
GDP as an alternative dependent variable in the empirical model. In the absence of priors for the
dynamics of new mortgages, we use a more parsimonious speciÞcation which includes two lags of
income changes besides the current change. Even though the sample is considerably smaller, we do
Þnd evidence that new mortgages respond more to changes in income when the LTV is high. The
interaction between income and the LTV ratio is positive, and statistically signiÞcant when we do
not add country dummies.
In column (9) we estimate our baseline model using the GMM estimator for dynamic panel
data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). More precisely, we implement the one-step Arellano-
Bond estimator with each of the base model variables instrumented by two of their own lags (in
levels). The Arellano-Bond estimator returns coefficients that are smaller than those from the OLS
regression. Yet, the effect of the maximum LTV ratio on income sensitivities is still positive and
statistically signiÞcant.23
Finally, recognizing the limitation of our sample size, we provide for a direct check of the
argument that our results could driven by the data from one speciÞc country. We do this check by
performing a series of GMM estimations of our baseline model, where we disregard data from one of
the sample countries at each run. The lowest point estimate we obtain for
P2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j
×LTVt equals 0.56, which is returned when we exclude Japan from the sample. That estimate is
statistically signiÞcant at the 3% level. Eliminating any of the other countries returns coefficients
which are signiÞcant at better than the 1% level.
C The income constraint
The theoretical arguments in Section II suggest that the effect of the LTV ratio on income sensitiv-
ities should only be signiÞcant if the collateral constraint is binding. As we pointed out, it is also
23The Sargan test statistic associated with the Arellano-Bond estimator of Table 5 (χ2(403)=392.1, p-value=64.2%)
reveals that the null of instrument validity cannot be rejected. Also supporting the adequacy of the estimator is the
high p-value (=83.5%) associated with the test of the null of no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals.
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possible that the income constraint is binding instead, which should eliminate (or at least reduce)
the positive association between maximum LTV ratios and income sensitivities. Identifying which
of those constraints will bind Þrst in each of the countries studied is not an obvious task. Arguably,
however, the income constraint is more likely to bind in countries where the price of a typical home
is high when compared to household disposable income. Table 2 shows that there is indeed some
variability across countries in the ratio of housing prices to disposable income. These differences
seem to be driven by geographical and demographic factors, such as country size and population,
and seem to convey information about how affordable is housing in different countries.
In the Þnal set of tests of the paper, we rank countries according to the distribution of the
price-disposable income ratio and classify as expensive (cheap) those in the top (bottom) third
of this ranking.24 We then run separate regressions for the two subsamples. The results from the
subsample regressions are shown in Table 6. To demonstrate the robustness of our results, the
table reports outputs from OLS and GMM estimations of the model with three lags of income and
prices as well as the results pertaining to the Lamont and Stein speciÞcation.
− insert Table 6 here −
Consistent with our predictions, the association between the LTV ratio and income sensitivities
is only signiÞcant in countries with relatively cheaper housing. This result is consistent across
estimation procedures and empirical speciÞcations. We interpret this last set of results as further
evidence that increases in the maximum LTV ratio increase the sensitivity of housing prices to
income because the Þnancial accelerator is stronger when the LTV is higher and households are
collateral-constrained.
V Concluding Remarks
In this paper we use the speciÞc features that characterize housing Þnance contracts and interna-
tional housing markets to provide fresh evidence supporting the Þnancial accelerator introduced
by Bernanke et al. (1996). SpeciÞcally, we use international variation in maximum loan-to-value
(LTV) ratios to identify within a group of arguably constrained agents those with more procyclical
24Our conclusions are mostly insensitive to whether we partition the data according to the median income-price
ratio or, alternatively, according to quartiles. As should be expected, the latter partition produces stronger but
noisier coefficients.
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borrowing capacity. Since the procyclicality in the borrowing capacity of constrained agents is the
ampliÞcation mechanism at the heart of the Þnancial accelerator, our empirical strategy allows us
to provide a direct test of the endogenous mechanism that underlies the accelerator. Our results
show that housing prices are more sensitive to aggregate income shocks in countries with higher
maximum LTV ratios, indicating that debt capacity is more strongly procyclical in such countries.
Furthermore, the empirical relationship between LTV ratios and income sensitivities is stronger in
countries where housing is cheaper relative to household income. Because the collateral constraint
is more likely to bind in such countries, this result is consistent with the idea that a collateral-based
Þnancial accelerator is behind the cross-country differences we observe in income sensitivities. Our
empirical analysis explicitly addresses a number of factors that could potentially inßuence the re-
sults we obtain. All of our results are consistent with an important role for the Þnancial accelerator
in household spending.
Besides being a nice laboratory to study the economic effects of the Þnancial accelerator, the
housing market is also one of the markets where the signiÞcance of such effects is likely to be high.
Previous literature has shown that consumer spending is intimately linked to housing wealth (see,
e.g., Case et al., 2001; and Engelhardt, 1996), and that housing investment plays a major role in the
business cycle (Mishkin, 1977, 1978; and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This paper shows that the
effect of the Þnancial accelerator in household spending and housing prices may help characterize
the mechanism through which shocks get ampliÞed and transmitted throughout the economy.
Finally, the results in this paper may have interesting implications for the welfare effects
of Þnancial development. Previous research has identiÞed excessive volatility in housing prices
(Poterba, 1991), and has argued that, within OECD countries, those with more liberal Þnancial
markets experienced undesirably high levels of housing price volatility during the 1980s and 1990s
(Stephens, 1995). Our results suggest a mechanism through which Þnancial development and lib-
eralization could magnify ßuctuations in housing prices. When Þnancial development is associated
with higher maximum LTV ratios collateral constraints are relaxed and the Þnancial accelerator
becomes stronger. Whether the Þnancial accelerator and other theories stemming from Þnancial
imperfections can account for the excess volatility of housing prices is an important matter for
public policy and for future research.
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A Data Appendix
This appendix describes in detail several of the data items we use in the paper.
A Housing Price Indices
Most of the data for developed countries are supplied by Peter Englund, which is the same data
used in Englund and Ioannides (1997). Below we refer to this source as EIO. Their data covers
the period 1970-1992. We update their data set using the Annual Reports from the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS), which give information on the same indices used by Englund and
Ioannides. For countries not included in the Englund and Ioannides data set, we use other sources
described below. We list all the speciÞc sources for each country, and the information we have
about the respective indices.
Australia. EIO, and BIS. Weighted average index of prices for all capital cities and other areas;
obtained from quarterly national census of home loan approvals, available annually. Updated using
the AUEHPI index from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Belgium. EIO, and BIS. Index based on annual transactions reports on small and medium sized
dwellings from entire country, with outliers excluded, available annually.
Canada. EIO, and BIS. Average annual transaction prices reported by multiple listing services
for entire country, covering 70% of all transactions. Updated using the New House Price Index
from the Statistics Canada, available at http://cansim2.statcan.ca.
Chile. Data provided by Felipe Morande, from Morande, F. and R. Soto (1992) updated by R.
Soto. Based on standardized dwellings in the area of Santiago, annual average.
Denmark. EIO, and BIS. Average value of single-family homes, including only arms length
sales, available annually.
Finland. EIO and BIS. Average price per apartment and terraced houses, obtained per square
meter, as recorded by realtors (including 30% of all transactions), weighted by region, available
quarterly.
France. EIO and BIS. Index based on BIS own estimate, based on annual values for the Paris
region, adjusted by four-year survey for entire country.
Germany. EIO and BIS. Transaction prices per square meter, obtained from realtors for the
four largest cities, available annually.
Hong Kong. Index constructed by the Rating and Valuation Department, from the Hong Kong
Property Review, data from Chou and Shih (1995), updated using data on the same index available
at http://www.info.gov.hk.
Ireland. EIO and BIS. Average transactions price for existing homes, based on all loan approvals,
available annually.
Israel. Property price index representative of the entire country, from the Social Sciences Data
Archive (data used in Bar Nathan et al., 1998), updated using data from the Israel Central Bureau
of Statistics (www.cbs.gov.il/srcer.cgi)
Italy. EIO and BIS. Average price for new and completely refurbished dwellings in large and
middle-sized cities and tourist areas, reported by realtors, available annually.
Japan. Urban Residential Land Price Index, from the Japanese Real Estate Institute, available
at www.reinet.or.jp.
Korea. Land Price of Housing, from the Korea Appraisal Board, Appraisal Research & Devel-
opment Center, available at www.kreic.com.
Malaysia. IHRM (Malaysian House Price Index % change from previous year). Data provided by
Steve Malpezzi and used in Malpezzi and Mayo (1997), updated using data from the Countrywides
Sourcebook 2000.
Netherlands. EIO and BIS. Weighted average sales price for existing single and multi-family
homes, reported by realtors, including 50-60% of all transactions, available annually.
New Zealand. Data from Dalziel and Lattimore (1999), Valuation New Zealand Housing Price
Series, average prices of free-hold house sales, adjusted for quality, updated using BIS data.
Norway. EIO and BIS. Average sales price of existing homes, weighted by type of dwelling,
reported by Property Owners Association, covering about 50% of all transactions.
Singapore. Data from Phang and Wong (1997). Value weighted average of current prices of Þve
types of property in Þve planning districts. Excludes public housing. Updated using the SIPRIRES
index of the Singapore Department of Statistics.
Spain. Data provided by O. Bover. Prices per square meter of new dwellings in Madrid, used
in Bover (1993). Updated with the Price Index for Existing Dwellings, from Hypostat 1999.
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Sweden. EIO and BIS. Index based on owner-occupied one- and two-dwelling buildings, based
on reports of title registrations for arms length transactions, weighted by type of dwelling, available
annually.
Switzerland. Real estate price index for 3-5 bedroom single family homes, from the Swiss
National Bank (http://www.snb.ch/e/search/index.html).
Taiwan. Median of Housing Prices in Taipei, provided by Shiawee Yang.
Thailand. Real housing price index used in Malpezzi and Mayo (1997). Data provided by S.
Malpezzi covering the period from 1970-1986. Updated using the series on Land Price Increases in
Bangkok, from the Agency for Real Estate Affairs.
UK. EIO and BIS. Index based on survey of all dwellings with building societies mortgages,
weighted by type of dwelling, available annually.
US. EIO and BIS. Index based on sales price of existing single-family homes, based on realtor
reports, adjusted by regional availability of single-family homes and homeowner mobility, available
annually.
B New Mortgages
Data for net new mortgage lending for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands
and Spain is from Hypostat 1989-1999, and data for Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
UK and US is from the OECD, also used by Girouard and Blondal (2001), and kindly provided to
us by Nathalie Girouard.
C Maximum LTV Ratios
Data is from Jappelli and Pagano (1994), updated with data from Chiuri and Jappelli (2000).
The data is given in 10-year averages. We extended this data as follows: for Denmark, Japan,
New Zealand and Norway we assumed the Jappelli and Pagano 1980-1987 data extends to 1990.
We took 1991-1999 data for Denmark and Norway from MacLennan, Muellbauer and Stephens
(1998). Singapore 1991-1999 data is from Phang and Wong (1997). The data for Chile, Hong
Kong, Korea (1980-1999), Japan (1991-1999), New Zealand (1991-1999) and Switzerland is from
the Countrywides Sourcebook, 1995 and 2000. Malaysia and Thailand 1991-1999 data is from the
Asian Development Bank, 1999.
D Homeownership Ratios
Data for Australia, Belgium, Canada (1970-1989), France (1970-1980), Germany (1970-1980), Italy
(1970-1980), Netherlands (1970-1980), Spain (1970-1980), and Taiwan is from Chiuri and Jappelli
(2000). Data for Chile, Denmark, Finland, France (1981-1999), Germany (1981-1999), Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy (1981-1999), Japan, Netherlands (1981-1999), Norway, Sweden and Spain (1981-
1999) is from the Countrywides Sourcebook 2000. Data for Korea and Malaysia is from the Asian
Development Bank, 1999. Data for Canada (1991-1999), New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland,
Thailand, UK and US is from the Euromonitor (available at www.euromonitor.com).
E Price-Income Ratios
The data on personal disposable income is from the Economic Outlook No 70: Annual and Semi-
annual data (Source: OECD), with the following exceptions: the data for Denmark and Thailand
is from DRI-Wefa (http://www.dri-wefa.com/), the data for Taiwan is taken from the Government
statistics at http://www.stat.gov.tw. We collected the nominal housing price for a particular year,
and then we used the housing price index described above to extrapolate the series for all years.
The data for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden represents
the typical price for a ßat of 150 square meters in 1999, and is taken from the Countrywides
Sourcebook 2000. The data for Canada (average price of all dwellings, 1995-1999), Ireland (average
new house price for the whole country, 1996-1998), Korea (median price of typical 710 square feet
apartment in Seoul in 1990), New Zealand (median price of a home, 1999), UK (Mix-adjusted av-
erage house price in 1999), and the US (average existing single family house price from 1990-1999),
are also taken from the Countrywides Sourcebook 2000. Below we list the sources and deÞnitions
for the remaining countries:
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Australia - typical house price in 1999, from http://www.amp.com.au/au/ampweb.nsf/Content.
Chile - price of an standardized dwelling in selected areas of Santiago, 1975-1998, from Morande
and Soto (1992).
Germany - price of existing detached houses, 1970-1993, from Muelder and Wagner (1998).
Hong Kong - price of a 100 square meter ßat, 1982-1992, from Chou and Shih (1995).
Israel - typical apartment price in 1999, from www.jpost.com
Japan - typical apartment price in 1999, from www.pricechecktokyo.com
Malaysia- typical price of a single-story detached home in 1998, from www.jpph.gov.my
Norway - average price of a 150 square meter ßat, from Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no).
Singapore - 1999, average house price from Asia Week, www.asiaweek.com
Switzerland - price of an average 4 bedroom semi-detached house with parking in 1999, from
www.expatacess.com
Taiwan - actual average housing purchase price, 1981-1989, from Lin (1993).
Thailand - 1994-97 average house price, from the Asian Development Bank.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Housing Price Changes, Income Growth, and
New Mortgages
This table displays summary statistics for housing prices chages, income growth, and new
mortgages for 26 countries over the 1970-1999 period. ∆Log(Price) is the log change in
the real housing price index. ∆Log(Income) is the log change in real per capita GDP. New
mortgages are net new lending against mortgage in residential property divided by nominal
GDP. GDP, population and inflation data are from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics. The housing price and new mortgage data are described in the Appendix.
Mean Std. Dev. Pct 5 Pct 25 Median Pct 75 Pct 95 N. Obs
∆Log(Price) 0.020 0.116 −0.150 −0.034 0.015 0.072 0.210 718
∆Log(Income) 0.030 0.045 −0.033 0.007 0.027 0.051 0.102 754
New Mortgages 0.030 0.022 0.002 0.015 0.027 0.040 0.069 278
Table 2: Maximum Loan-to-Value (LTV), Homeownership, and Price-Income
Ratios by Country-Decade, 1970-1999
Maximum LTV ratios represent the highest mortgage loan that households can get
from lenders as a fraction of the value of the property owned. The homeownership
ratio is the proportion of homeowners as a fraction of total households. The price-
income ratio is the nominal price of a typical home divided by personal disposable
income per capita. All data items are described in the Appendix.
Country LTV Ratio Homeown. Ratio Price/Income Ratio
70’s 80’s 90’s 70’s 80’s 90’s 70’s 80’s 90’s
Australia 0.70 0.80 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.70 10.5 8.5 9.5
Belgium 0.65 0.75 0.80 0.66 0.66 0.66 9.4 7.5 8.4
Canada 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.63 0.63 0.64 8.9 7.8 8.6
Chile N/A N/A 0.78 N/A 0.63 N/A N/A 9.0 13.0
Denmark 0.85 0.95 0.80 N/A 0.55 0.52 N/A 8.8 7.6
Finland 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.61 0.65 0.62 16.4 15.3 10.1
France 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.57 0.53 0.54 8.9 8.4 9.8
Germany 0.65 0.65 0.80 0.43 0.43 0.41 22.3 18.0 15.7
Hong Kong N/A 0.90 0.70 0.18 0.33 0.47 N/A 21.8 34.0
Ireland 0.80 0.90 0.80 N/A 0.77 0.79 9.6 9.0 9.1
Israel 0.50 0.70 N/A 0.70 N/A 0.80 N/A 19.0 25.1
Italy 0.50 0.56 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.73 17.2 14.4 10.7
Japan N/A 0.60 0.55 0.60 0.62 0.60 22.2 22.1 20.4
Korea 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.59 0.52 0.52 41.6 42.4 32.3
Malaysia 0.65 N/A 0.85 N/A N/A 0.67 N/A 21.9 24.2
Netherlands 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.48 0.46 0.51 12.2 9.5 11.0
New Zealand 0.66 0.80 0.80 N/A 0.71 0.73 7.4 7.0 8.8
Norway 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.76 13.8 13.6 9.6
Singapore N/A N/A 0.85 N/A 0.90 0.88 N/A 32.4 43.2
Spain 0.60 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.78 10.3 10.6 13.2
Sweden 0.90 0.95 0.75 0.50 0.54 0.60 15.1 11.2 9.6
Switzerland N/A N/A 0.90 0.30 0.31 N/A N/A 36.5 27.1
Taiwan 0.40 N/A N/A 0.77 0.78 0.84 7.2 7.6 4.5
Thailand 0.65 N/A 0.75 0.89 0.86 0.82 17.4 16.5 29.4
UK 0.81 0.87 0.95 0.56 0.61 0.67 10.4 10.6 8.6
US 0.80 0.89 0.80 0.66 0.64 0.65 7.4 7.3 6.9
Table 3: Housing Price Dynamics
The dependent variable is ∆Log(Price), the log change in the real housing price index. ∆Log(Income) is the log change
in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita
GDP. Real interest rate is the nominal long-term interest rate on a government bond (usually 10-year benchmark government
bond yield), from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics or from the OECD’s Economic Outlook, minus the inflation
rate in the same year. Inflation rate is the change in the consumer price index for the current year, taken from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics. The estimation period is 1970-1999. The estimations correct the error structure both for
heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆Log(Income)t 1.187 0.942 0.942 1.125 1.061 1.009 1.022
(9.07)*** (6.61)*** (6.36)*** (7.17)*** (6.94)*** (7.13)*** (7.49)***
∆Log(Income)t−1 0.510 0.409 0.555 0.214 0.356
(3.38)*** (2.52)*** (3.47)*** (1.44) (2.40)**
∆Log(Income)t−2 0.248 0.083 0.342 0.171 0.176
(2.23)** (0.58) (2.15)** (1.13) (1.17)
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.241 0.193 0.347 0.278 0.348
(3.33)*** (2.61)*** (4.84)*** (3.76)*** (5.34)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.099 −0.111 −0.169 0.045
(−1.62) (−1.80)* (−2.46)*** (0.85)
Interest Rate −0.289
(−2.41)**
Inflation Rate −0.109
(−1.06)
Pricet−1/Incomet−1 −0.253 −0.246
(−7.67)*** (−7.50)***P2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 1.700 1.434 2.022 1.446 1.541
Summation Test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Exclusion Test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Country Effects? No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 718 679 666 666 616 666 692
Adj-R2 0.226 0.265 0.310 0.317 0.381 0.408 0.378
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 4: House Prices and the Multiplier Effect: Baseline Regressions
The dependent variable is∆Log(Price), the log change in the real housing price index.
∆Log(Income) is the log change in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the
start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita GDP. Real
interest rate is the nominal long-term interest rate on a government bond (usually
10-year benchmark government bond yield), from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics or from the OECD’s Economic Outlook, minus the inflation rate in the same
year. Inflation rate is the change in the consumer price index for the current year,
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. LTVt is the maximum LTV
ratio for year t. The estimation period is 1970-1999. The estimations correct the error
structure both for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in
parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Log(Income)t −0.437 −0.787 −0.622 −0.273 0.051
(−0.96) (−1.31) (−1.00) (−0.42) (0.10)
∆Log(Income)t−1 1.174 1.029 0.132
(1.11) (1.03) (0.17)
∆Log(Income)t−2 −0.470 −0.199 0.504
(−0.62) (−0.24) (0.91)
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.228 0.174 0.299 0.332
(3.01)*** (2.08)** (4.21)*** (4.88)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.070 −0.081 −0.089
(−1.35) (−1.47) (−1.71)*
Interest Rate −0.287
(−1.39)
Inflation Rate −0.092
(−0.69)
Pricet−1/Incomet−1 −0.231
(−8.71)***
LTVt −0.065 −0.037 −0.214 0.007 −0.068
(−1.52) (−0.81) (−2.40)** (0.16) (−0.82)
∆Log(Income)t × LTVt 2.276 1.315
(3.58)*** (1.80)*P2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 2.152 2.414 1.420
×LTVt (2.45)*** (1.95)** (1.75)*
Country Effects? No No Yes No Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 611 567 567 531 589
Adj-R2 0.220 0.297 0.316 0.342 0.362
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 5: House Prices and the Multiplier Effect: Alternative Specifications
The dependent variable in columns (1) through (6) and (9) is ∆Log(Price), the log change in real housing price index. The dependent variable
in columns (7) and (8), New Mortgages, is the net new lending against mortgage in residential property divided by GDP. ∆Log(Income) is the
log change in real per capita GDP. Pricet−1/Incomet−1 is the start-of-period ratio of the real housing price index to real per capita GDP. In
columns (1) and (2) we instrument LTVt with proxies for the quality of accounting standards and judicial efficiency. Judicial efficiency is an
assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, compiled by the Business International Corporation,
taken from LaPorta et al. (1998). Acounting standards is the index of accounting standards computed by the Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research, data from LaPorta et al. (1998). In columns (3) and (4) we control for the level of economic development (PPP-ajusted
per capita GDP) by including the intercept variable as well as its interactions with each of the lags of ∆Log(Income) (coefficients omitted).
Likewise, in columns (5) and (6) we add intercept and interaction terms for homeownership and ∆Log(Income). The data for per capita GDP in
constant prices is from Penn World Tables, taken from the Barro and Lee (1994) dataset, and augmented with data from the Global Development
Finance & World Development Indicators. The homeownership ratio is the proportion of homeowners as a fraction of total households. In
column (9) we use the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The estimation period is 1970-1999.
The OLS estimations correct the error structure both for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
IV Added Controls for Added Controls for Dep. Variable: GMM
Fin. Develop. Econ. Develop. Homeownership New Mortgages
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆Log(Income)t −2.940 −2.717 −0.671 −0.512 −0.971 −0.900 −0.632 −0.584 −0.471
(−2.51)** (−2.36)** (−1.17) (−0.85) (−0.88) (−0.79) (−1.82)* (−1.75)* (−0.94)
∆Log(Income)t−1 1.802 1.884 1.194 1.054 1.044 0.828 0.266 0.195 1.968
(1.04) (1.13) (1.13) (1.07) (0.86) (0.68) (0.86) (0.82) (2.75)***
∆Log(Income)t−2 −1.583 −1.357 −0.411 −0.187 −0.113 0.001 −0.219 −0.176 −1.766
(−1.35) (−1.09) (−0.53) (−0.23) (−0.13) (0.01) (−0.64) (−0.63) (−3.73)***
∆Log(Price)t−1 0.227 0.188 0.230 0.184 0.233 0.164 1.051
(2.86)*** (2.14)** (3.05)*** (2.21)** (2.90)*** (1.77)* (23.80)***
∆Log(Price)t−2 −0.088 −0.099 −0.076 −0.091 −0.049 −0.068 −0.315
(−1.64) (−1.49) (−1.45) (−1.64) (−0.83) (−1.08) (−7.45)***
LTVt −0.077 −0.079 −0.056 −0.175 −0.038 −0.217 0.052 0.059 −0.025
(−0.97) (−1.01) (−1.17) (−2.10)** (−0.79) (−2.40)** (3.88)*** (2.62)*** (−2.23)**P2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j 6.078 5.924 2.085 2.275 2.048 3.214 0.947 0.765 0.754
×LTVt (3.66)*** (2.83)*** (2.04)** (1.56) (2.15)** (2.60)*** (1.85)* (1.48) (3.37)***
Country Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 567 567 510 510 265 265 567
Adj-R2 0.313 0.322 0.307 0.323 0.289 0.316 0.231 0.512 52.05(a)
Table Notes: (a) F -statistic. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
Table 6: The Income Constraint Effect
For each country, we use the average price-income ratio for the period 1970-1999 (subject to data availability) to classify
countries in the “cheap” and “expensive” categories. The price-income ratio is the nominal price of a typical home
divided by personal disposable income percapita. Cheap (expensive) housing countries are those ranked in the bottom
(top) third of the cross-country distribution of the ratio of house prices to per capita GDP. The countries in the cheap
housing category are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Tawain, and the US.
The expensive housing countries are: Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand.
The estimation period is 1970-1999. The baseline-OLS specification is the one in column (3) of Table 4, including three
lags of income and housing price changes, as well as the interactions of the LTV ratio with the income changes. The
baseline-GMM specification uses the GMM estimator for dynamic panel data proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
as in column (7) of Table 4. The Lamont and Stein specification is the one in column (5) of Table 4, which includes
the current change in per capita GDP and its interaction with the LTV ratio. The OLS estimations correct the error
structure both for heterosckedasticity using the White-Hubber estimator. t-stats (in parentheses).
Baseline—OLS Baseline—GMM Lamont-SteinP2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j × LTVt
P2
j=0∆Log(Income)t−j × LTVt ∆Log(Income)t × LTVt
Cheap Housing Countries 8.497 2.808 9.742
(1.64)* (2.59)*** (3.92)***
Expensive Housing Countries 2.508 0.227 1.001
(1.38) (0.45) (0.93)
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.
